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III. PRIVACY AND SPEECH IN CONFLICT
ESSAY
ABORTION AND SPEECH: A COMMENT
Thomas Win. Mayo*
AST Term, in Rust v. Sullivan,' the United States Supreme Court
upheld the Reagan administration's ban on abortion counseling and
referrals by family-planning clinics that receive so-called "Title X"
funds from the federal government. 2 The Department of Health and Human
Services ("DHHS") included the ban in its 1988 regulations that imposed
three new conditions upon recipients of federal funds for Title X family
planning projects. First, the regulations state that Title X projects may not
"provide counseling concerning the use of abortion as a method of family
planning or provide referral for abortion as a method of family planning."'3
Thus, a pregnant patient could not be given a referral list that is weighted in
favor of health care providers who offer abortions or that includes a health
care provider whose principal business is the provision of abortions.4 Sec-
ond, the regulations prohibit Title X projects from "encourag[ing],
* Associate Professor and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Southern Methodist
University School of Law; Of Counsel, Haynes and Boone, Dallas, Texas. I owe a debt of
gratitude to Joyce Iliya, Class of 1992, for her splendid research help, to the M.D. Anderson
Foundation for its financial assistance, and to Paul McGreal and the other editors of the SMU
Law Review for their encouragement and patience.
i. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
2. 42 C.F.R. pt. 59 (1991). In 1970, Congress enacted Title X of the Public Health
Service Act (hereinafter "Title X" or "the Act"), Pub. L. No. 91-572, § 6, 84 Stat. 1506 (1970)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300 to 300a-8 (1988)), to provide federal funding for family planning
services. Section 1008 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6 (1988), provides that "[n]one of the
funds appropriated under [Title X] shall be used in programs where abortion is a method of
family planning." Regulations promulgated between 1970 and 1988 by the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare, and later by the Department of Health and Human Services
("DHHS"), did not contain a ban on abortion referral and counseling by Title X programs.
See Carole I. Chervin, The Title X Family Planning Gag Rule: Can the Government Buy Up
Constitutional Rights?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 401, 406 (1989).
3. 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(1) (1991). Effective March 20, 1992, DHHS modified its ban on
abortion counseling and referral to permit physicians, but not nurses and nurse-practitioners,
to discuss abortion with their patients. See Philip J. Hilts, White House Allows Some Advice At
Public Clinics About Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1992, at Al. The modification was inval-
idated by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, see National Family Planning &
Reproductive Health Ass'n v. Sullivan, No. 92-935 (CRR), 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7043
(D.D.C. May 28, 1992), which thereafter refused to stay its order invalidating the modifica-
tion, see id., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9421 (July 1, 1992).
4. Id.
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promot[ing] or advocat[ing] abortion as a method of family planning."
And, third, the regulations require that Title X projects maintain "program
integrity," that is, that the projects be organized and operated to keep them
financially and physically separate from abortion activities.
6
In upholding the regulations, the Rust Court offered a majority opinion
that simply missed the mark. The majority's tortured analysis in Rust might
have been unexceptionable, at least for an-opinion on abortion, 7 but its re-
sults were not. Without ever conceding that it was doing so, the opinion
expanded the powers of administrative agencies and altered the legal envi-
ronment surrounding the physician-patient relationship.
Rust simultaneously expands the scope of federal agencies' interpretive
powers while it diminishes the judiciary's role as an arbiter of statutory
meaning. Reviewing the ban on abortion counseling and referrals, the Court
deferred to the DHHS's interpretation of Title X, which did not mention
either subject. In support of this conclusion, the Court invoked Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,8 under which, if a
statute is silent or ambiguous on an issue that is the subject of judicial re-
view, a court should defer to the agency's regulation as long as it is based
upon a permissible reading of the statute.
Another principle of judicial review, however, provides that "where an
otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitu-
tional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems
unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress." 9
Consistent with this principle, the Court has held since Chevron that an
agency's otherwise permissible construction of a statute is not entitled to
deference if it raises serious constitutional questions that may be avoided if
"there is another interpretation, not raising these serious constitutional con-
5. Id. § 59.10(a).
6. Id. § 59.9.
7. As the Court's abortion opinions mount in number, each new opinion must tip-toe
even more delicately than the last through the doctrinal minefield created by the Court's prior
opinions. One need be no fan of the opinions in Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492
U.S. 490 (1989), either by Chief Justice Rehnquist for the majority, id., or by Justice Scalia, id.
at 532 (concurring in part & concurring in the judgment), to agree with their characterizations
of the Court's abortion doctrine as "a web of legal rules that have become increasingly intri-
cate," id. at 518, and that have resulted in "chaos," id. at 535 (Scalia, J.). But cf Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2809 (1992) (opinion of
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) ("Although Roe has engendered opposition, it has in no
sense proven 'unworkable,' representing as it does a simple limitation beyond which a state law
is unenforceable"). The Court's opinion in Rust represents an alternative to the intricate and
highly nuanced opinion that attempts to render prior holdings faithfully, to conform as nearly
as possible to precedent, to be candid and honest about one's own holding, and to announce
departures from precedent accurately and promptly, see generally David L. Shapiro, In De-
fense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731 (1987) (delineating the content of a judicial
"obligation of candor"). The often difficult task of writing candidly becomes a good deal sim-
pler as soon as one or more of these obligations is abandoned.
8. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
.9. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council,
485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988); see also United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 401 (1916);
United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 407-08 (1909).
[Vol. 46
ABORTION AND SPEECH
cerns, that may fairly be ascribed to" the statute. 10 The Court responded to
this rule by concluding that no serious constitutional questions were even
raised by the Title X regulations and therefore Chevron required judicial def-
erence to DHHS's interpretation. 1
The record does not support the Court's conclusion that there was no
serious question whether DHHS's interpretation of Title X constituted dis-
crimination on the basis of viewpoint (in violation of the First Amendment)
or an excessive restriction on the privacy rights of women (in violation of the
Fifth Amendment): "[d]isposition of the constitutional issues comprised half
of the majority's opinion,"' 2 four dissenting justices vigorously pressed the
constitutional arguments against the regulation,' 3 and the circuit courts
were split over the constitutional issue. 14 Rather, it seems that the Court is
now willing to sacrifice constitutionally inspired interpretative norms in
favor of a broad principle requiring deference to agency interpretations.' 5
Rust's impact upon the physician-patient relationship is, if anything, even
more pronounced. The Court's earlier informed-consent rulings had effec-
tively insulated physicians and their patients from state efforts to prescribe
various disclosures intended to discourage women from terminating their
pregnancies.' 6 In one of these cases, the Court explained that the state's
10. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp., 485 U.S. at 577.
11. Rust v. Sullivan, Ill S. Ct. 1759, 1771 (1991).
12. The Supreme Court, 1990 Term-Leading Cases, 105 HARV. L. REV. 177, 395 (1991).
13. See Rust, Ill S. Ct. at 1178-80 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
14. Compare Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Sullivan, 913 F.2d 1492 (10th Cir.
1990) (holding that regulation violates the first and fifth amendments) and Massachusetts v.
Sullivan, 899 F.2d 53 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding the regulation violates the first amendment) with
New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1989) (upholding the constitutionality of the Title
X regulation), rev'd sub nom. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
In addition to the indicia of substantiality discussed in the text, law review writers recog-
nized the significance of the issue. See, e.g., Chervin, supra note 2; compare, e.g., Janet Ben-
shoof, The Chastity Act: Government Manipulation of Abortion Information and the First
Amendment, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1916 (1988) with Theodore C. Hirt, Why the Government is
not Required to Subsidize Abortion Counseling and Referral, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1895 (1988).
15. Cf, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 2071, 2111-13 & n. 196 (1990); The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, supra note 12, at
389-90, 395-99.
It has also been suggested that Rust further expands Chevron by requiring judicial deference
to an agency's interpretation on a pure question of law, which the Court appeared to say was
inappropriate in Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446
(1987). See Comment, Administrative Agencies Get Their Way Over Constitutional Rights in
Rust v. Sullivan, 28 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 173, 177 (1991). At least four members of the
Court, however, reject what they characterize as the "dicta" in Cardoza-Fonseca, see NLRB v.
United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 484 U.S. 112, 133-35 (1987) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring), and the rule has come under heavy academic attack as well. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra at
2094-96.
16. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747
(1986) (holding unconstitutional statutory requirement that a woman who seeks an abortion be
told (1) the name of the physician who will perform the abortion, (2) the "particular medical
risks" of the abortion procedure and of carrying the child to term, (3) the possibility of "detri-
mental physical and psychological effects" of abortion, (4) that medical assistance benefits
may be available for prenatal care, childbirth, and neonatal care, (5) that the father is liable
for child support, and (6) that printed materials are available from the state that describe the
fetus and list agencies that offer alternatives to abortion); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for
Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (holding unconstitutional city ordinance that
1992]
SMU LAW REVIEW
required disclosure "is, or comes close to being, state medicine imposed
upon the woman, not the professional medical guidance she seeks, and it
officially structures - as it is obviously intended to do - the dialogue be-
tween the woman and her physician"' 7 and that "[t]his type of compelled
information is the antithesis of informed consent."' 8 Indeed, in Roe itself,
the Court wrote that the right to choose includes the right to seek the advice
and guidance of a physician without undue governmental interference.19
Admittedly, the Court's recent decision in Planned Parenthood of South-
eastern Pennsylvania v. Casey20 represents a change of heart concerning de-
tailed informed consent requirements.2' Yet Casey broadly reaffirms the
Court's support for the more general principle in its earlier informed-consent
cases that access to the guidance and assistance of a physician is an essential
part of the right to choose. More specifically, after Casey states may require
the giving of "truthful, nonmisleading information about the nature of the
procedure, the attendant health risks and those of childbirth, and the 'prob-
able gestational age' of the fetus."
'22
By contrast, the Court in Rust upheld a wholesale federal assault upon the
notion of "choice" and "informed consent" by upholding DHHS's ban on
informative and informed discussions of the abortion option. The result is a
physician-patient relationship in Title X clinics that the government requires
to be half-truthful (and to that extent untruthful 23) and inherently
misleading.
required a woman who seeks an abortion be told (1) the fetus's gestational age, (2) "that the
unborn child is a human life from the moment of conception, (3) a detailed account of "the
anatomical and physiological characteristics of the particular unborn child at the gestational
point of development at which time the abortion is to be performed," (4) that the fetus may be
viable if its gestational age exceeds 22 weeks, (5) that the "attending physician has a legal
obligation to take all reasonable steps to preserve the life and health of her viable unborn child
during the operation," (6) a detailed descriptions of the risks attendant to surgical abortion
procedures, and (7) the availability of public and private family-planning, pregnancy, and
postnatal services).
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992), the
Court overruled Akron and Thornburgh "[tlo the extent [those cases] find a constitutional
violation when the government requires, as it does here, the giving of truthful, nonmisleading
information about the nature of the procedure, the attendant health risks and those of child-
birth, and the 'probable gestational age' of the fetus". Id. at 2824.
17. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 763.
18. Id. at 764.
19. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
20. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
21. See supra note 16.
22. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2824 (emphasis added).
23. See George J. Annas, Restricting Doctor-Patient Conversations in Federally Funded
Clinics, 325 NEw ENG. J. MED. 362 (1991):
[P]hysicians can mislead patients as much by silence as by direct advice. In the
doctor-patient context, a half-truth is the same as a lie, and it violates both medi-
cal ethics and the doctrine of informed consent. By legally approving inherently
unethical behavior, the Court's opinion in Rust is a direct attack on medical
ethics in the doctor-patient relationship.
Id. at 364 (emphasis added); see also Jeremy Sugarman & Madison Powers, How the Doctor
Got Gagged. The Disintegrating Right of Privacy in the Physician-Patient Relationship, 266
J.A.M.A. 3323, 3327 (1991) ("Legislation that introduces a political agenda into practice ... is
both medically and morally unsound").
[Vol. 46
ABORTION AND SPEECH
The Rust opinion's two consequences - the expansion of federal agency
authority in the sphere of legislative interpretation and the distortion of the
physician-patient relationship - are linked by a common failing. The ma-
jority vastly underestimated the constitutional significance of the speech ele-
ments of the case. The Court's decision has been criticized, 24 even by
commentators who agree with the Court's ultimate resolution of the consti-
tutional issues, 25 for its failure to take seriously the first amendment issues
raised by petitioners. Perhaps the Court was being manipulative and disin-
genuous, 2 6 but it is also possible that the Court simply could not or would
not recognize the gravity of the constitutional issues before it.
The key to understanding Rust's failure is the Court's reliance upon the
reasoning of its earlier "abortion funding" cases. In Maher v. Roe 27 and
Harris v. McRae,28 the Court held that the states and Congress were not
obligated to fund abortions as part of the state-federal Medicaid health care
program.29 The essential holding of those cases was that the government
may express a preference for child-birth over abortion through its funding
decisions, and its decision to fund and thereby encourage one type of activity
does not penalize or burden the unfunded activity. The government may not
affirmatively burden or interfere with the exercise of a fundamental right,
but neither is it required to alleviate burdens or ameliorate interferences
(such as the indigency of Medicaid beneficiaries) that otherwise exist.
The reasoning in Maher, Harris, and for that matter in Rust itself, par-
takes of the semi-mystical aphorism, "the greater power includes the lesser
power." Congress was under no constitutional obligation to create and fund
the Medicaid 30 and the Title X family planning programs. The "greater"
power to fund none of these activities, the argument seems to go, includes
the "lesser" power to fund only those health care or family planning activi-
ties that please the sovereign, or to impose such restrictions on the conduct
and speech of employees as may please the sovereign. 3 ' As beguiling as this
24. See Note, Administrative Agencies Get Their Way Over Constitutional Rights in Rust v.
Sullivan, 28 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 173 (1991).
25. See The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, supra note 12, at 395 ("Although the major-
ity correctly decided the constitutional issues, it ought never to have reached them.").
26. Id.
27. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
28. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
29. Maher addressed only the right of states to exclude funding for nontherapeutic abor-
tions, i.e., those that are not "medically necessary." See Maher, 432 U.S. at 466. Harris, on
the other hand, permitted the federal government to refuse funding for both therapeutic and
nontherapeutic abortions, except to save the life of the mother or when the pregnancy was the
result of rape or incest. See Harris, 448 U.S. at 302.
30. The point has been debated extensively, see, e.g., 2 & 3 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR
THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE & BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL RE-
SEARCH, SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE: THE ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF DIFFER-
ENCES IN THE AVAILABILITY OF HEALTH SERVICES (1983), but the Supreme Court has
decided the issue, see Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1980) (rejecting as "extraordi-
nary" the argument that the due process clause would have required Congress to subsidize
medically necessary abortions "even if Congress had not enacted a Medicaid program to subsi-
dize other medically necessary services").
31. Any suggestion that the doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions" is in danger of ex-
tinction should be taken seriously. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Con-
1992]
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logic appears to be (at least to some members of the Court3 2), it is deeply
flawed in the context of the regulations at issue in Rust. When the "lesser
power" to attach conditions on the appropriation of Title X funds leads to a
gag rule on physicians and nurses employed by the Title X project, the Court
cannot claim on DHHS's behalf that the agency is writing on a blank slate.
Congress has created an environment that permits, even encourages, the cre-
ation of a physician-patient (as well as counselor-patient and nurse-patient)
relationship. By creating a set of affirmatively slanted and misleading rules
for speech about abortion, DHHS has imposed restrictions on those profes-
sionals that undermine the relationship and harm both the patient and the
physician.
The Court in Rust failed to see that the Title X regulations were not part
of a simple, binary, on/off, funded/unfunded governmental program para-
digm. The relevant context in which to assess the gravity of the constitu-
tional issues in Rust was not "the greater power includes the lesser power,"
because the choice at the time the Title X regulations were promulgated and
at the time the Court decided Rust was not between "no family planning
program" and "a family planning program with restrictions on speech."
The relevant context for a constitutional analysis of the regulations in Rust
was the situation that existed at the time the regulations were promulgated.
There existed a government-backed family planning program, in which wo-
men - many of them young, minority women, lacking the financial means
to obtain private family planning assistance, and some (perhaps more) lack-
ing the social and psychological support to deal without assistance with their
reproductive choices - were dependent upon the professional judgment,
assistance, and advice of others. The federal government itself was responsi-
ble for the creation of that trusting, dependent relationship, and the Title X
regulations pervert that relationship at the expense of the woman who is
effectively invited by the government to walk into the Title X clinic.
I do not mean to suggest by these comments that the element of timing is
significant. The Title X regulations would be just as offensive if they had
been promulgated when the Title X funds were first appropriated eighteen
years earlier. The burden of the argument comes down to this: Once the
federal government decides to fund a program within which the physician-
patient relationship is created, it alters the social conditions, the choices, and
the world view of the patient. It encourages her to enter into a relationship
ditions Doctrine is an Anachronism (With Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and
Abortion), 70 B.U.L. REV. 593 (1990) (arguing that the doctrine has outlived its usefulness);
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1416, 1417
(1989) (the doctrine is "riven with inconsistencies" and in "disarray"). See also RODNEY A.
SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 217 (1992) ("the government may pretty well
attach whatever conditions it wants to the receipt of its funds, even when those conditions
quite brazenly prefer one set of ideas over another").
32. See, e.g., Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 3072 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting);
City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750, 763 n.8 (1987); Posadas de
Puerto Rico Assocs., dba Condado Holiday Inn v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328,
359 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 633 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring in part & dissenting in part); Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 127-29
(1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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with clinic personnel in which she has a right to expect that professional
rules of disclosure, candor, and honesty apply. The government simply may
not act as though it had nothing to do with the creation of that relationship
or those expectations. Given its role in their creation, it is passing strange
that the government (speaking through the Rust Court) refused to acknowl-
edge their importance or even their existence.
33
It is in this respect that the Rust Court's reliance upon DeShaney v. Win-
nebago County Department of Social Services34 is instructive. In that case,
Joshua DeShaney was beaten mercilessly by his father until he became per-
manently comatose. The father's violence toward his infant son had been
faithfully documented by the social services authorities of Winnebago
County, Wisconsin, who did nothing to help Joshua escape. Joshua's guard-
ian sued the local officials who had not intervened, 35 and the Supreme Court
held that there was no state action and, thus, no violation of the fourteenth
amendment supporting damages under the civil rights statutes.36 The Court
stated that "nothing in the language of the Due Process Clause ... requires
the State to protect the life, liberty and property of its citizens against inva-
sion by private actors. The Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State's
power to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and secur-
ity."' 37 The Rust Court uses this comment to support its conclusions that
"[t]he Government has no constitutional duty to subsidize an activity merely
because the duty is constitutionally protected" 38 and that the Title X regula-
tions are constitutional because they do not impermissibly burden or penal-
ize a woman's choice to obtain an abortion.
39
Dissenting in DeShaney, Justice Brennan argued that there was, indeed,
state action in that case, in the form of a child welfare system that led citi-
zens to rely upon the public agencies to "do something" about cases of do-
mestic violence. 4° The existence and operation of a county department of
human services changed the factual backdrop against which the saga of do-
mestic violence was played out, and that change influenced neighbors and
other officials to rely on county officials to intercede. To borrow a phrase
33. My analysis here borrows from the insights in Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of
Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn From Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1989). A related point-that the pervasiveness of the government in everyday life requires
stricter scrutiny of restrictions that are attached to government programs-is made by ROD-
NEY A. SMOLLA, supra note 31, at 218-19.
34. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
35. The first time Joshua was hospitalized with multiple bruises and abrasions, the county
obtained a court order that placed the boy in the temporary custody of the hospital. Three
days later, however, a team of experts concluded that there was insufficient evidence of abuse
to continue the custody order. Id. at 192. Joshua was returned to his father. Over the next
seven months, case workers recorded the evidence of continued abuse, but nothing more was
done to protect Joshua from his father. Id. at 192-93.
36. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201-202. The civil rights statutes at issue were 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1983, 1985, 1988 (1988).
37. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195.
38. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1777 (1991).
39. Id.
40. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 204-05 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1992]
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from Professor Sunstein, 41 the government itself changed the baseline, and
in so doing, the otherwise private conduct of a father was transformed into a
failure of public institutions, as well.
In a similar vein, the Rust Court's failure to attach significance to the first
amendment and privacy rights of clinic patients and personnel is a
DeShaney-like failure. When the Court concluded that patients are no worse
off by virtue of the new regulations than they would have been if no Title X
project had been made available and funded,42 it ignored the government's
involvement in creating and supporting the intimate relationship that exists
between physician and patient. The federal government invited Title X pa-
tients into family-planning clinics whose counseling programs were sup-
ported by the government itself. It provided patients with physicians and
nurses and the opportunity to consult with them. The patients had govern-
ment-created and government-backed expectations of a traditional, trust-
based relationship with health care professionals. In addition, the patient's
reliance upon the government was made more acute by Title X's financial
requirements. If the patient could contribute to the cost of her counseling
and care, a fee was collected from her, which reduced the patient's financial
ability to obtain unbiased counseling from a private clinic.
43
If the Court had been more sensitive to the federal government's role in
shaping this relationship, it might well have found enough merit in the con-
stitutional claims of the clinics to reject the Chevron rule of deference to
DHHS's statutory interpretation. A truly independent judicial review of the
Title X regulations might have led the Court, in turn, to reject DHHS's
interpretation of Title X and to protect the integrity of the professional rela-
tionship that the federal government had brought into existence.
A similar lack of perspective may well plague Bray v. Alexandria Women's
Clinic,44 the next major abortion controversy to be decided by the Court.
The proliferation of protests at abortion clinics across the country over the
past two years45 made Bray one of the most closely watched cases of the
Supreme Court's 1991 Term. Now that the Supreme Court has ordered the
case to be held over for reargument, 46 Bray will be one of the most closely
41. See Sunstein, supra note 31, at 601-03.
42. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1776-78.
43. See Massachusetts v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 899 F.2d 53 (lst Cir.
1990).
44. National Org. for Women, 726 F. Supp 1483 (E.D. Va. 1989), aff'd, 914 F.2d 582 (4th
Cir. 1990), cert. granted sub nom., Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 111 S. Ct. 1070
(1991).
45. See generally Catherine S. Manegold, 194 Arrested in Protests at Buffalo Abortion
Clinics, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1992, at B9; Gina Kolata, Nomadic Group of Anti-Abortionists
Uses New Tactics to Make Its Mark, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1992, at AI2; Planned Parenthood
Clinic In Montana Damaged by Fire, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1992, at A15; 95 Arrested at Abor-
tion Protest in Wichita, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1991, at A20; Operation Rescue Condemns Death
Threats, Oppressed by Zealots, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1991, at A22; Felicity Barringer, Abortion
Foes Clog Vermont Courts, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1990, at A12; 41 Protesters Arrested at an
Abortion Clinic, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1990, pt. 1, at 39.
46. See Bray v. Alexandria Women's Clinic, 60 U.S.L.W. 3827 (U.S. June 8, 1992) (order
that "[t]his case is restored to the calendar for reargument").
[Vol. 46
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watched cases of the 1992 Term, as well. The Court's order provides some
evidence that the eight justices who heard oral argument in the case before
Justice Clarence Thomas was confirmed are deadlocked and that Justice
Thomas's vote is needed to break a tie.47 Thus, it seems certain that Bray
will be not only a close decision, but also another early test of the judicial
philosophy of the Court's newest justice.
48
The underlying facts of Bray are all too familiar:
To achieve [the goals of stopping the practice of abortion and reversing
its legalization,] the individual defendants have agreed and combined
with one another and with defendant Operation Rescue to organize,
coordinate and participate in "rescue" demonstrations at abortion clin-
ics in various parts of the country .... The purpose of these "rescue"
demonstrations is to disrupt operations at the target clinic and indeed
ultimately to cause the clinic to cease operations entirely .... By dis-
rupting and blockading family planning clinics, defendants and their
followers hope (i) to prevent abortions, (ii) to dissuade women from
seeking a clinic's abortion services and (iii) to impress upon members of
society the moral righteousness and intensity of their antiabortion
views.
49
Acting under the authority of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3),50 the district court en-
joined the defendants "from, in any manner or by any means, trespassing on,
blockading, impeding or obstructing access to or egress from any facility at
which abortions, family planning or gynecological services are provided in"
seven communities in northern Virginia.5 1 Out of concern over the limits of
47. See Linda Greenhouse, High Court Delays Ruling on Protest, N.Y. TIMEs, June 9,
1992, at Al.
48. See Linda Greenhouse, Consequential' Cases Are Likely to Test the Supreme Court's
New Majority, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 7, 1991, at A14. In his first abortion case, Justice Thomas
voted with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Scalia to overrule Roe v. Wade.
See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 60 U.S.L.W. 4795, 4826 (U.S.
June 29, 1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); id. at 4835 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
49. National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1488 (E.D. Va.
1989), aff'd, 914 F.2d 582, 586 (4th Cir. 1990).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988) provides:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on
the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either
directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of
the laws, or of the equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the
purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or
Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory
the equal protection of the laws; or if two or more persons conspire to prevent
by force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote,
from giving his support or advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor of the
election of any lawfully qualified person as an elector for President or Vice Pres-
ident, or as a Member of Congress of the United States; or to injure any citizen
in person or property on account of such support or advocacy; in any case of
conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do,
or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy,
whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and
exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so
injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned
by such injury or deprivation, against one or more of the conspirators.
51. National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1497 (E.D. Va.
1989), aff'd, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990).
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the first amendment, however, the district court refused plaintiffs' request
for an injunction against "those 'rescue' operations that tend to intimidate,
harass or disturb patients or potential patients of the clinics."' 52 The Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court in all respects. 53
Although the Bray case is about abortion protests, it is not being treated
as a case about the law of abortion or the law of protests. The case will not
be won or lost on the basis of the constitutional doctrines of privacy under
the fourteenth amendment or freedom of speech under the first amend-
ment. 54 Instead, the primary issues 55 in Bray are (1) whether the abortion
protests that target women generally, or women seeking abortions more spe-
cifically, meet section 1985(3)'s element of "discriminatory class-based ani-
mus," 5 6 and (2) whether defendants have conspired to deprive the
statutorily-protected class of its constitutional right - not to obtain an abor-
tion - but to engage in interstate travel.57
It is not hard to imagine the reasons why the right to abortion is not at the
center of the Bray case. For one, the rule announced in Roe v. Wade is a
fourteenth-amendment limitation upon state action, and it may plausibly be
argued that the protesters who blockade entrances to abortion clinics are
52. Id.
53. See National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d 582, 586 (4th Cir. 1990).
54. Despite the district court's finding that two of the purposes of the blockade were "to
dissuade women from seeking a clinic's abortion services and ... to impress upon members of
society the moral righteousness and intensity of their antiabortion views," National Org. for
Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1488 (E.D. Va. 1989), aff'd, 914 F.2d 582,
586 (4th Cir. 1990), neither lower court held that the protest blockades were speech or sym-
bolic expressive conduct entitled to protection under the first amendment. Indeed, the lower
courts took care to distinguish Operation Rescue's purely physical blockades, which the courts
held could be enjoined, from conduct that tended to "intimidate, harass or disturb patients or
potential patients," which both lower courts agreed could not be enjoined without violating the
first amendment. See id. at 1497. Respondents did not file a cross-petition to challenge the
courts' denial of their injunction against the offensive speech elements of defendants' protests,
so the Court will not have an opportunity to consider the first amendment issue.
55. In addition to the two issues discussed in the text accompanying infra notes 56-57, the
parties have also briefed issues that relate to pendent claim jurisdiction and attorney fees. See
Teree E. Foster, Do Organized Blockades of Abortion Clinics Violate Federal Law?, PREVIEW
31, 33 (Issue 2, 1991).
56. Although the statute does not contain the phrase, "discriminatory class-based ani-
mus," see supra note 50, but instead addresses conspiracies directed against "any person or
class of persons" (emphasis added), the Supreme Court's earlier opinions have created such a
requirement. See United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 834-35
(1983); Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971).
The Court has stated that it is an open question "whether a conspiracy motivated by invidi-
ously discriminatory intent other than racial bias would be actionable under ... § 1985(3),"
Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102; see also Scott, 463 U.S. at 836 (describing the question as a "close"
one). Many of the comments made by members of Congress during the floor debates in 1871
support the inference that Congress did not intend to limit the statute to discrimination against
blacks. See, e.g., Neil H. Cogan, Section 1985(3)'s Restructuring of Equality: An Essay on
Texts, History, Progress, and Cynicism, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 515, 559-68 (1987); Comment, A
Construction of Section 1985(3) in Light of Its Original Purpose, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 402, 407-
11 (1979).
57. Although it appears that the parties briefed the abortion/privacy issue, the court of
appeals concluded, "The district court did not, and we do not, reach the question of whether
§ 1985(3) can encompass violations of a right to privacy". National Organization for Women
v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d 584, 586 (4th Cir. 1991).
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engaged in private conduct, not state action. Lower federal courts have con-
sistently held that state action, not purely private conduct, is a required ele-
ment of a section 1985(3) claim based upon an interference with the rights of
abortion or privacy.58 More importantly, at the time Bray was being liti-
gated in the lower courts, it was widely feared that the Court lacked a solid
majority that still supported the principal conclusion in Roe that there is a
fundamental constitution right to choose whether to have an abortion. 59
Under these circumstances, there were sound strategic reasons for the plain-
tiffs and the lower courts in Bray to rely principally, if not exclusively, upon
the right to travel. The result of all this, however, is an inability to identify
abortion as the logical, rhetorical, and emotional center of the Bray case, and
an argument for the plaintiffs may have been lost in the process.
The argument that state action is a required element in a section 1985(3)
action where the challenged activity is intended to deprive plaintiffs of a
right guaranteed against government interference reflects two central con-
cerns: federalism and judicial workloads. Without this requirement, the ar-
gument goes, any private conspiracy aimed at the deprivation of any federal
right would become a federal case. Because state laws cover trespass,
breaches of the peace, and the like, there is no need for a federal remedy.
Thus, the creation of a federal remedy would be an expression of disrespect
of state law enforcement and judicial officers,6° and it would seriously over-
burden the federal judicial system with claims in which the federal govern-
ment's interest was slight.
61
And yet, surely there are times when local laws, or local law enforcement
institutions, are or will be inadequate to defend the constitutional interests of
58. See, e.g., New York State NOW v. Terry, 704 F. Supp. 1247, 1260 (S.D.N.Y. 1990);
Roe v. Operation Rescue, 710 F. Supp. 577, 582-83 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Portland Feminist Wo-
men's Health Ctr. v. Advocates for Life, Inc., 681 F. Supp 688, 691 (D. Ore. 1988); Chico
Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Butte Glen Medical Soc'y, 557 F. Supp. 1190, 1197 (E.D.
Cal. 1983).
59. Of the five justices who refused to join Chief Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion or
Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490
(1989), both of which invited the Court to overrule Roe v. Wade, only three justices remain on
the Court (Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and O'Connor). Those three justices were joined by
Justice Souter and Justice Kennedy (who voted with Chief Justice Rehnquist in Webster) to
form a bare majority in favor of retaining the essential features of Roe in Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 60 U.S.L.W. 4795 (U.S. June 29, 1992).
60. Cf Win. Bradford Reynolds, Judicial Excess in Wichita, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1991, at
Ell (nat'l ed.) ("Kansas has perfectly adequate trespass, nuisance and battery laws to use
against Operation Rescue demonstrations.... In declining jurisdiction in [an abortion protest]
case like Judge Kelly's [in Wichita, Alabama district judge] Propst said 'it would be a sign of
judicial arrogance' to suggest that the state courts could not deal with the issues").
61. Cf Scott v. Moore, 680 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc), rev'd sub nom., Scott v.
Moore, 463 U.S. 825 (1983):
The extension of § 1985(3) to protect against private infringement of every
right protected against governmental action by the Constitution would create a
Bivens-type tort action against every private conspiracy that affects a federal
constitutional right. A citizen has a right to be secure in his property and home,
but we do not think that § 1985(3) confers a cause of action for a conspiracy by
a person's neighbors to block his driveway in order to keep him from driving his
automobile to his place of business.
Id. at 1014 (Rubin & Williams, JJ., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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plaintiffs under siege. Section 1985(3) itself provides a remedy for such cases
in its "preventing and hindering clause," 62 by which, "[i]f private persons
take conspiratorial action that prevents or hinders the constituted authorities
of any state from giving or securing equal treatment, the private persons
would cause those authorities to violate the 14th Amendment." 63 Under the
right set of facts, then, even private action could "trigger" state action suffi-
cient to overcome the concerns expressed in the preceding paragraph. It is
difficult to avoid the impression that when state and federal officials ignore
the lawless interference with a woman's exercise of that right, they are not
simply tolerating the interference but are participating in it, as well. The
plaintiffs in Bray did not make this argument, 64 however, and the Supreme
Court will presumably not consider it.
This point is brought into even sharper focus by the Rust/DeShaney para-
digm. When the Court in Roe recognized a woman's fundamental right to
choose whether to terminate a pregnancy, it arguably altered the "base-
line" 65 so as to require a federal remedy for private assaults on that right.
The Court told women that they had a federal constitutional right to choose
to have an abortion through the first trimester of their pregnancy, and about
1.5 million women a year exercised that right by going to clinics and hospi-
tals to obtain abortions. The Court subsequently upheld state requirements
that first-trimester abortions be performed in hospitals or licensed clinics,
66
which centralized abortion services and made it easy for abortion protesters
to locate abortion providers and seekers. 67 Just this past Term, the Court
upheld Pennsylvania's requirement of a twenty-four-hour waiting period be-
tween the informed consent disclosures and the abortion procedure.68 As a
result, women seeking abortions may be subjected to two gauntlets of jeering
protesters.
This is a stage that has been created and set by the federal government.
The Court itself has placed these actors and forces in motion. It would be a
denial of reality for the Court to hold that criminal conduct aimed at
preventing the exercise of abortion rights is not imbued with sufficient fed-
eral interest to warrant the invocation of section 1985(3). Without this view
of the world it has helped to create, it seems unlikely that a majority of the
Court will perceive that the case has profound implications for the right to
abortion.
62. See supra note 50.
63. Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 384 (1979).
64. See National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1494, n. 11
(E.D. Va. 1989).
65. See supra note 41 & accompanying text.
66. See Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 506 (1983) (upholding requirement that abor-
tions be performed in either a hospital or an appropriately licensed clinic).
67. Finding abortion providers will be even easier now that the Court has upheld the
constitutionality of state requirements of detailed recordkeeping and reporting by abortion
facilities. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791,
2832-33 (1992).
68. See id. at 2825-26.
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